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Charles Blatz in his paper seems to make two related points. First, he tries in a systematic
manner to explore the relationship between mutualistic argumentation (MA) and metacognitive frameworks of thinking (MCF) by showing how the former contributes to the
shaping of the latter and how the latter also influences the various ways in which
arguments are worked out with a view to achieving agreement that is both thought
constituting as well as will forming. The second point is exegetic; it shows the similarities
and significant differences between what Bourdieu calls habitus and how MCF’s operate
by building forms of agreement and mutual acknowledgment that on the one way
enhance and on the other limit the practical and cognitive relations of individuals to
themselves and to one another. I agree with much of what the author has to say in his
complex and detailed investigation and see no point in trying to fully reconstruct his ideas
and arguments in my response. Instead, I will focus on some questions and problems that
might be raised in relation to some parts of the paper with the hope that these comments
will provide the author with the opportunity to further develop his work as well as clarify
some aspects of it.
First I would like to explore the issue of normativity and values. In relation to this,
I also hope to raise some questions about the wider social and moral implications of the
paper, dealing with the question of consensus formation through reaching understanding
and the attendant issues of social integration and autonomy. The question of how norms
are constituted, challenged, and modified seems to always be present in the background
of Blatz’s discussion of the way in which MA works, but the author does not explicitly
address the question of normativity in his paper. Moreover, by insisting that MA is
closely associated with corresponding MCFs, which are always present as the cognitive
and practical background condition for MA, as premises as well as goals, the author
seems to suggest that norms that are implicit in MCF come out into the open in MA. This
raises the interesting question of how, exactly, is MA related to MCF when the question
of normativity becomes the front issue. Is MA the privileged space where norms are
constituted, that is, agreed upon, before being relegated to the status of background
conditions of operation of MCFs? Or, rather, the MCF is the normative background that
always already directs and controls the way in which MA is pursued? If it is the latter,
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can one, then, speak of mutualistic argumentation as a creator of new normative contents,
in often disruptive ways, or is MA just the outward form in which MCFs assert or reassert
their dominance, as habitus does for Bourdieu. This seems to be the case in situations of
normative disruption (disputes over which norms apply to certain life situations or
whether they do indeed apply) or in situations of cognitive indetermination that require
additional clarifications, interpretations, etc. As well, if the latter were the case, can we
even speak of argumentation or mutuality as opposed to legitimate interpretation and
enforcement of preexisting norms?
Also on the question of norms: Are norms of argumentation, whether mutualistic
or agonistic, reducible to or deducible from the implicit norms that endow MCFs with
their powerful hold on the minds of the agents? If they are not, is there something specific
about the kind of attitude we adopt when engaging in either MA or AA, something that
transcends, whether in the psychological mindset of the arguers, or in the content,
practical or cognitive, of their communication that transcends the limits of the MCF from
within which they normally operate? Furthermore, and presuming that norms regulate
needs whose interpretation is always bound to the value horizon of the individuals who
are engaged in argumentation, is there a specific set of values that orient MA? Or, if they
are reducible to the value horizon of a dominant MCF, does it mean that, whenever norms
are agreed upon, the agreement just happens to reproduce a more tolerant or liberal MCF
that is the result of historical, social, or psychological contingency? If this were the case,
what chances are there to achieve MA against the pressures of some repressive kind of
MCF unless one appeals to a normative standpoint that is not reducible to that MCF.
Since he argues against Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, I suspect that Blatz has something
of this sort in mind. Could it be that he also assumes some fundamental kinds of goods or
values, such as those that lead to greater inclusion and personal autonomy, and his
discussion of MA and MCF is just the way in which he tries to articulate the reasons why
we should also prefer these values?
Second, and in relation to the previous point, I wish to discuss the important role
of agonistic argumentation and cognitive thought in disrupting false or coerced consensus
and clearing the setting for achieving consensus on different factual, normative, and
evaluative foundations that were perhaps available before a false consensus was
achieved. Blatz acknowledges the many ways in which agonistic and mutualistic
argumentation inter-penetrate one another, and he uses several interesting examples to
make his point. But I’m wondering if the dialectical relation between these different ways
of arguing and the types of cognition and cognitive (or meta-cognitive) forms is not in
some cases reducible to instances of mutualistic argumentation that also must be
intrinsically agonistic in order for the condition of mutuality to lead to reaching
understanding, consensus, and social integration that preserves individuality and
autonomy. Or, conversely, can it be that cognitive thought assumes the leading role in
securing MA against reductive or repressive MCFs, as in some of the examples provided
(i.e. Galileo)? In such instances, it seems to make more sense to go directly to those
deeply, often even personally felt normative disruptions that stand out in any MCF with
the force of frustrated expectations or moral injury. In such cases, we are dealing with
what is real in social and mental life itself that pierces through the shield of any MCF or
habitus thereby guiding argumentation, either mutualistically, or agonistically, toward
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newer and more encompassing forms of integration. If so, notions such as MA, AA, CT
or MCF can only have heuristic value.
Third, I will briefly discuss some significant differences in the way in which
Bourdieu regards habitus (as a deeper, practical relation between available forms of
social and personal representation of the self, the world, and the relation between these
two) and the way in which Blatz constructs the duality MA-MCF in order to show that
MCF may be seen as overstepping the boundaries of habitus by allowing for more
cognitive and normative autonomy, which has beneficial but not necessarily decisive
results, while in other respects MCF may be regarded as operating within the boundaries
of an existing habitus and thus as being conditioned by habitus in ways that might
undermine MA.
The notion of habitus in Bourdieu has a very strong, practical connotation. It
penetrates not only how we think, but also how we perceive and how we relate to the
world and ourselves in a physical, even bodily fashion. Habitus is so ingrained in our
thinking and action that it constitutes a second nature for the individual and the group,
and individuals are socialized in, and culture and the social structures of the world are
reproduced by means of, the learning processes that lead to specific forms of social
integration by way of acquired habitus. In this respect, habitus seems to fundamentally
differ from a MCF, which seems to be closer in nature and mode of operation to
something like Foucault’s notions of episteme and/ or mentalitè. At any rate, and against
some of the author’s explicit remarks on this issue, MCF appears to enjoy a greater
autonomy, and therefore that it can more easily undergo transformations, because the
model on which it is conceptualized seems to come closer to a cognitive or theoretical
notion of mind rather than a practical model of the will – which I define in Bourdieu’s
terms, as something deeply ingrained in the physical and psychical structure of a person.
In this sense, the essential difference between MCF and habitus may be reduced to a
difference in the underlying conceptual model of the self on which each is premised.
If this is true, then MCF and habitus as understood by Blatz and Bourdieu, are
very distinct notions because they are called to fulfill different epistemic roles by design.
Thus, and depending on the angle from which we approach the relationship between
these two, in some respects MCF seems poorly equipped to fulfill the more substantive
function that Bourdieu reserves for the habitus, while in some other respects habitus
seems too “wooden,” to use the Blatz’s expression, to perform the kind of cognitive and
practical functions that MCF can assume due to its greater autonomy. I wonder, therefore,
if the underlying difference between these two cannot be reconciled by reference to the
implicit anthropological conceptions on which they rest, which might throw new light
onto how MA is either enhanced or limited depending on the standpoint from which it is
considered.
Link to paper
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